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LEGAL LIABILITY OF HOLDING COMPANIES
LEGAL LIABILITY OF HOLDING COMPANIES FOR ACTS
OF SUBSIDIARY COMPANIES
BY SAM ELSON
Modern corporate jugglery cannot but excite the amazement
and wonder of the magician and wizard. The tortuous convolu-
tions and manifold intricacies of present day corporate and hold-
ing company structures exhibit the age-old operation of legal
ingenuity in taking the utmost advantage of statutory inade-
quacy and judicial inability to cope with a kaleidoscopic eco-
nomic evolution. Recent complaints by the Interstate Commerce
Commission to the effect that its orders are being evaded by the
use of the subsidiary device; the use of the holding organization
in the utilities field to minimize the effect of rate regulation and
state taxation, and to defeat clear statutory policy; and the
facility with which the holding structure lends itself to extensive
stock manipulation, all indicate the necessity of a changed atti-
tude in corporate legislation, and in the meantime a more strin-
gent judicial application of present corporation law to unfore-
seen development.'
This paper, however, is not concerned with the social or eco-
nomic impolicy of the phenomenal increase in the use of the
holding company device, or with the larger problems of pro-
gressive regulation of such corporations in their various activi-
ties; rather is it concerned with the narrower problem as to the
extent of the operation of the principle of limited liability to the
parent-subsidiary relationship, or as stated above-the legal
liability of holding companies for acts of subsidiaries. Insofar
as the courts perceive an identity of the holding company and
the subsidiary, however, the related problems of regulation, tax-
ation, etc., become more susceptible of solution.
Involved in an ascertainment of such liability is the funda-
mental issue of the disregard of the corporate entity.2 The
existence of the corporation as an entity distinct and apart from
'See St. Louis Post-Dispatch, April 13, 1930. Also People ex rel. Pot-
ter v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co. (Mich. 1929) 224 N. W. 330.
SBallantine, Separate Entity of Parent and Subsidiary Corporations
(1925) 14 CAL. L. REv. 12.
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its stockholders is basic in corporation law; it is factual and not
a mere fiction of law. And correlative with the principle of
separate entity is that of limited liability of stockholders to the
extent of the assets of the corporation. The question, then, as to
the holding company is-shall the ordinary principles of sep-
arate entity and limited liability apply, in view of the peculiar
position of the holding company as a stockholder of the sub-
sidiary? Does the normal and necessary interrelationship be-
tween the parent and subsidiary-involving stock control of the
latter by the former--call for the operation of the classical
maxim that
A .. corporation will be looked upon as a legal entity
as a general rule, until sufficient reason to the contrary ap-
pears; but when the notion of legal entity is used to defeat
public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or defend
crime, the law will regard the corporation as an association
of individuals8
It should not be inferred from the above statements that the
holding company, organized solely for the purpose of holding
stock in and controlling other corporations, does not have a valid
economic and financial justification. The attractiveness of
limited liability with multiple insulation through the holding
company, the increased facility of financing and marketing of
securities, the non-necessity of qualifying as a foreign corpora-
tion under onerous conditions in a particular state, and the
economy and efficiency of unified control are among the features
of the holding company plan.4 That the principle of limited
liability is deeply imbedded in our legal economic system and has
had a potent effect in our industrial and commercial growth, no
one would deny. "It is legitimate for a man or group of men to
stake only a part of their fortune on an enterprise. Legis-
latures, courts and business usages have made it so. Each has
taken the extreme but logical step of allowing one man to do
'U. S. v. Milwaukee Ref. Transit Co. (C. C. Wis. 1905) 142 F. 247; note
(1926) 10 MINN. L. Ruv. 598.
'Douglas and Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary
Corporations (1929) 39 YALE L. J. 193, list also the retention of the good
will of an established business unit, the avoidance of taxation, and the
avoidance of cumbersome management structures.
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what one thousand men may do. ' 5 And thus we-have the practi-
cally universal acceptance of the one-man corporation and dum-
my incorporators., The holding company-subsidiary relation
is comparable structurally to the one-man corporation form, but
as we shall see, the former practice carries with it peculiarities
in operation which give it far greater social significance.
A brief examination of the philosophical concept of the cor-
porate entity is highly desirable for a proper perception of the
problem. Two theories dominate corporate rationalization7 the
first, the German or Association theory, which regards the cor-
poration as virtually a natural person with an "organic char-
acter which qualifies it to participate prominently in the life of
the state and in the law." The corporation acquires an inde-
pendent collective legal personality., The second view regards
the corporation as a fiction, "an artificial being, invisible, intan-
gible and existing only in contemplation of law."9  Neither of
these views, nor a third one, that the corporation is a "name for
'Ibid. 193, 194.
1 Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. (1897) A. C. 22; Elenkrieg v. Siebrecht
(1924) 238 N. Y. 254, 144 N. E. 519. Some decisions have held that cor-
porations do not fall within the statutory designation of persons capable of
incorporating. Denny Hotel Co. v. Schram (1893) 6 Wash. 134, 32 Pac.
1002. Nebraska Shirt Co. v. Horton (Neb. 1903) 93 N. W. 225. But the
corporation may make use of dummy incorporators, and if the corporate
charter does not forbid, later acquire the stock. Kardo Co. v. Adams
(C. C. A. 6, 1916) 231 F. 950. See also State v. Mo. Pac. Ry. (1911) 237
Mo. 338, 141 S. W. 643. In Maryland the corporate existence is deemed
suspended where the stock is in the hands of a sole stockholder until some
of the stock is disposed of to third parties. Swift v. Smith, Dixon & Co.
(1886) 65 Md. 428, 5 Atl. 534. But the general rule is that sole owner-
ship does not affect the existence of the corporate entity, unless other cir-
cumstances call for a disregard. Louisville Banking Co. v. Eiseman (1893)
94 Ky. 83, 21 S. W. 531; Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co. (1896) 96 Tenn. 252,
34 S. W. 209. See also Button v. Hoffman (1889) 61 Wis. 20, 20 N. W.
667; note (1926) 10 MINN. L. REv. 598. Werner v. Hearst (1903) 177 N. Y.
63, 69 N. E. 221.
'Wormser, DISREGARD OF THE CORPORATE FICTION AND ALLIED CORPORA-
TION PROBLEMS (1929) 3.
Under this view corporations may be guilty of personal and intentional
crimes. U. S. v. N. Y. Herald Co. (1907) 159 F. 296; U. S. v. McAndrews
& Forbes Co. (1906) 149 F. 823.
'Marshall, C. J., in Dartmouth College v. Woodward (U. S. 1819) 4
Wheat. 518, 636. ". . . for the general purposes and objects of a law this
invisible incorporeal creature of the law may be considered as having cor-
poreal qualities." Bank of U. S. v. Deveaux (U. S. 1809) 5 Cranch 61, 89.
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a useful and usual collection of jural relations," 10 is enlightening
for our inquiry. A more realistic interpretation regards the cor-
porate entity as the sum of the stockholders. "The factual cor-
porate entity is comprised of individuals in their capacity as
stockholders with a common purpose of carrying on a particular
enterprise." Tlie corporation is not separate and distinct from
its collective stockholders.' This view is more significant in
dealing with the problem of the holding company, since the lia-
bility of such a company depends exclusively upon its relation to
the subsidiary, involving stock control and corporate domination.
The numberless euphonious statements of the principles
governing the disregard of the entity of the holding company,
such as that "Generally the holding company is treated as a sep-
arate corporation, unless such separate existence is a mere sham,
or is used as an instrument for concealing the truth, or where the
organization and control is a mere instrumentality of such other
company,"' 12 are of little value without regard to cases and cir-
cumstances. 3 Nowhere in the law does there exist a greater
" Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. v. Pierson (1927) 130 Misc. Rep. 110, 116-7,
222 N. Y. S. 532.
n Note (1927) 27 CoL. L. REv. 702. See also Machen, Corporate Person-
ality (1910) 24 HARV. L. REV. 253; Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the
Corporate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REv. 128; Hohfeld, FUNDA-
MENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTS (1914) 194. The proper view of the corporate
entity attains importance in determining the jurisdiction of the federal
courts. One theory obtaining in the jurisdictional cases is that the cor-
poration is an association of persons conclusively presumed to be citizens
of the state of incorporation. Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co.
(U. S. 1853) 16 How. 314. The other regards it "to all intents and pur-
poses as a person, although an artificial person, . . . capable of being
treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural person." Louisville,
Cincinnati & Charleston v. Letson (U. S. 1844) 2 How. 497.
=Thompson, CORPORATIONS (1927) sec. 4098, citing for non-liability
East St. Louis Connecting R. Co. v. Jarvis (C. C. A. 7, 1899) 92 F. 735;
Crane v. Fry (C. C. A. 4, 1903) 126 F. 278; Pittsburgh R. Co. v. Duncan
(C. C. A. 6, 1916) 232 F. 584; Martin v. Development Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1917)
240 F. 42; Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co. (C. C. A. 9, 1923) 299 F. 405;
Stone v. Cleveland etc., R. Co. (1911) 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816, 35 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 770; Borough of Cambridge v. Philadelphia Co. (1925) 283 Pa.
St. 5, 129 Atl. 67, 39 A. L. R. 1064.
Typical statements are these: "All fictions of law are introduced for the
purpose of convenience and to subserve the ends of justice .... When they
are urged to an intent and purpose not within the reason and policy of the
fiction, they must be disregarded by the courts." State v. Standard Oil
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confusion in the judicial approach. Liability of the parent com-
pany for acts of a subsidiary is explained variously by the magi-
cal terms "agency," "instrumentality," "adjunct," "alter ego,"
"single enterprise," "complete control," and many others. Judge
Cardozo acutely observes: "The whole problem of the relation
between parent and subsidiary corporations is one that is still
enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law are to
be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought,
they end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the cor-
porate entity will be ignored when the parent corporation oper-
ates a business through a subsidiary which is characterized as
an 'alias' or a 'dummy.' All this is well enough if the pictur-
esqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the es-
sential term to be defined is the act of operation."' 4 Conse-
quently loose statements of "agency" and "business conduit"
help little toward a satisfactory rationale.15
The primary value of the corporate form of doing business lies
in the separation of capacities, in the non-liability of stockhold-
ers for the acts of the corporation whose exercise of activity
Co. (1893) 49 Ohio St. 137, 30 N. E. 279. "In ordinary, everyday business
transactions such as the acquisition of property, the making of contracts,
the institution and the defense of suits, and the like, it is essential that the
distinction between the corporation as a legal entity and a fictitious person-
ality, on the one hand, and its stockholders, on the other hand, should be
strictly maintained. 'But where the corporate form is used by individuals
for the purpose of evading the law, or for the perpetration of fraud, the
courts will not permit the legal entity to be interposed so as to defeat
justice.'" Wormser, op. cit. 29.
Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry. (1926) 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61.
"In numerous cases it is contended that a subsidiary corporation is so
far owned and controlled by another as to make the parent corporation re-
sponsible for the acts and obligations of the subsidiary. Unfortunately it
does not seem possible to lay down any definite test as to when the usual im-
munity of the stockholder should be disregarded, but the courts assign
various grounds which to a great extent are vague and illusory. It may
be found in the first place that in substance the relation of principal and
agent exists between the two corporations. It is often said, secondly, that
one corporation is the mere 'agency,' 'adjunct,' or 'instrumentality' of the
other, as if this were something different from principal and agent. In
other cases the courts speak of the two corporations as being the same
identical concern under different names by reason of the mingling or con-
fusing of their business affairs, as where one is merely the selling agency
of the other. In other cases the courts purport to go only on the ground of
prevention of fraud, evasion and illegality." Ballantine, op. cit. 15.
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finds its ultimate stimulus in the stockholders. Although the
corporation carries on business in behalf of its stockholders, the
latter are not thereby principals of the former, nor is there
ordinarily any liability for obligations of the former.10 But one
corporation may be the agent of another corporation, as in the
case of individuals. This, however, does not help us determine
what facts of ownership, control, financing and management in
the parent-subsidiary relationship impress the obligations of the
latter as those of the former. The unctuous principle that the
corporate entity will be disregarded whenever necessary to at-
tain substantial justice or avoid fraud is not helpful, because the
requirements of justice in the particular case are not always ap-
parent, as shown by the severe criticism of the Moore & Handley
Hardware Co. v. Towers Hardware Co.27 and the People's
Pleasure Park v. Rohleder 8 cases. The problem is not one sub-
" "Whenever a corporation makes a contract, it is the contract of the
legal entity, of the artificial being created by the charter and not the con-
tract of the individual members. Taney, C. J., in Bank of Augusta v. Earle
(U. S. 1839) 13 Pet. 519, 587. Thus, even a sole stockholder does not own
individually the corporation property, and cannot recover it in an action of
replevin by him. Button v. Hoffman (1889) 61 Wis. 20, 20 N. W. 667.
And he is not liable for injuries inflicted by the corporation. Werner v.
Hearst (1903) 177 N. Y. 63, 69 N. E. 221. In Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.
U. S. Shipping Board (1922) 258 U. S. 549, contracts made by the Fleet
Corporation for work on ships were held enforcible against it, although
the United States, the sole stockholder, was immune. Salomon v. Salomon
& Co., Ltd. (1897) A. C. 22. See Canfield, The Scope and Limits of the Cor-
porate Entity Theory (1917) 17 COL. L. REV. 128.
1, (1889) 87 Ala. 206, 6 So. 41. A, B, & C sold their business to X, re-
ceived the consideration, and agreed not to run a similar business in the
same town. Later they incorporated and engaged in the same business.
An injunction for X was refused on the ground that it was the corporation
that carried on the business, and not A, B, & C. See note (1926) 36 YAIM
L. J. 254.
(1908) 109 Va. 439, 61 S. E. 794. A corporation formed by negroes
successfully took title to land held under restrictive covenant against con-
veyance to colored persons. Of course the solution is clear where there is
an obvious attempt at fraud as in Booth v. Bunce (1866) 33 N. Y. 139,
where a creditor of a financially embarrassed firm successfully followed
property transferred by the partnership creditors. The entity was also
lisregarded in Donovan v. Purtell (1905) 216 Ill. 629, 75 N. E. 334, where
a real estate dealer organized a number of dummy realty companies having
offices in the same room and the same officers and directors, with an indis-
criminate use of the property of all for the purpose of evading judgments.
See also Quaid v. Ratkowsky (1918) 183 App. Div. 428, 170 N. Y. S. 812.
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ject to formalistic treatment; it is to some extent a philosophical
inquiry with the allocation of business risk as its center thread.
And, as indicated above, although the subsidiary corporation is a
species of one-man corporation, cases in which the sole stock-
holder is held for the acts of the corporation, or vice versa, are
not decisive of the parent-subsidiary cases, since the latter
group presents a far more complicated and perplexing interrela-
tionship.-
I.
Before entering into a discussion of specific cases it should be
noted that there are various types of holding companies, the
only constant being stock control of the subsidiary either by the
parent or by the same persons controlling both. The investment
trust, organized primarily to hold stock in diversified companies
with an eye to the distribution of risk, does not concern us pri-
marily, since it does not normally enter into a managing, oper-
ating or unusual controlling relationship with the companies
whose stock it holds, and aside from stock control there would
be no reason for a variation from the principle of limited lia-
bility of the stockholder-in this case the investment trust. A
second type involves the parent and subsidiary, both in the same
general business, each in a different locality, illustrated by the
Berkey case, discussed below, with the three identities of con-
trol, ownership, and business objective. Another form is one
by which the parent uses the subsidiaries in different stages of
manufacture of the same product or products, with the parent
again possessing all the possible advantages of direct ownership
through stock control of the subsidiaries, each of which is inter-
dependent in the complete process. Another structure growing
in favor is the pyramidal type, with holding company on holding
company in a bewildering maze-though with a definite profit-
able purpose. These are referred to as "pure" holding companies
in contrast with those above, and here again the problem of lia-
bility is as complex as the structure, with a generalization of
nonliability for obligations of the subsidiaries in the absence of a
' See Wenban Estate v. Hewlett (1924) 193 Cal. 675, 222 Pac. 723, and
Campbell v. Hanford (Cal. 1924) 227 Pac. 234.
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violation of the rules assuring insulation, to be discussed later.
Other forms of holding companies are as various as the forms of
business; but practically all fall within the well-defined groups
listed.
What, then, are the criteria which govern the liability or non-
liability of the particular holding .company for acts or obliga-
tions of its subsidiaries? Although no mechanical "Open Se-
same" can be advanced, certain objective factors characterizing
the relationship, such as identity of stockholders, identity of
officers, the manner of keeping books and records, the methods
of conducting the corporate business "as a separate or a mere
department of the other concern," have significance in demon-
strating the incidents and use made of stock control of the sub-
sidiary.2° The financial solidity of the subsidiary and its ability
to meet the normal capital drains of business are also factors of
large effect in determining whether there has been a juggling
of capacities so as to make the parent properly responsible.21
However, it is clear that liability does not come down merely to
a question of good faith and honesty in the use of the corporate
"Douglas and Shanks, op. cit., list the following pertinent characteristics
of operation: (1) Ownership of all of the stock of the subsidiary; (2)
Ownership of a majority of the stock of the subsidiary or the controlling
interest therein; (3) Ownership by the same persons of the stock of both
corporations; (4) Sufficiency or insufficiency of the capital of the subsidiary
as measured by that employed in normal competitive units; (5) Degree to
which the subsidiary was financed by the parent; (6) The method of such
financing; (7) The extent to which there was a common directorate; (8)
The extent to which there were common officers and employees; (9) The
extent to which separate meetings of stockholders and directors were held;
(10) The extent to which both had common departments of business; (11)
The degree to which interests between the two were favorable to one
rather than the other; (12) The extent to which separate books and ac-
counts were kept; (13) The extent to which an officer or director of one
was permitted to determine the policies of the other; (14) The extent to
which an employee, officer, or director of the parent was causally con-
nected with the tort or contract on which suit is brought; (15) The type of
business of each; (16) The extent to which the trade or public generally
regarded the two units as one business unit; (17) Whom the contract
claimant regarded as the promisor; (18) The extent to which there were
conveyances by the subsidiary to the parent in fraud of creditors of the
former. See also notes (1920) 4 MINN. L. REV. 219, (1920) 29 YALE L. J.
659.
' Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., supra note 14; Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. Grace
Co. (C. C. A. 4, 1920) 267 F. 676.
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privilege for legitimate ends, for this begs the issue of legiti-
macy.
That the ownership of all or a majority of the stock of the
subsidiary or a controlling interest therein, or ownership by the
same person or persons of all or a majority of the stock of both
companies does not result in itself in a merger of the two cor-
porations,22 or liability of one for the acts of the other,23 is a
principle clearly established. To a lesser extent it is agreed that
the normal exercise of the ordinary incidents of stock owner-
ship-such as the election of directors, the making of by-laws,
and the increase or decrease of the authorized capital stock-car-
ries no more liability for the parent than for any other stock-
holder, even with the additional fact of duplication of directors
or executive officers; for identity in management in itself does
not mean assimilation of the two activities.24 The question then
is raised, which can only be answered by an analysis of the cases,
what participation in the affairs of the subsidiary-without at-
tempting to define the terms "assimilation" or "domination"-
can be deemed so extraordinary or abnormal that the corporate
insulation will be of no avail? The issue is not entirely-as one
writer has suggested-as to the form that the control has taken,
but is also one as to its substance and extent.
For purposes of convenience, and because the element of re-
liance by the claimant appears in the contract and not in the tort
cases, the two types of cases are discussed separately. Perhaps
the most widely discussed case in which the parent was sought
to be held for the tort of the subsidiary and one presenting as
evenly divided a group of facts as could be desired, is the famous
"In Gramophone and Typewriter Ltd. v. Stanley (1906) L. R. 2 K. B.
856, aff'd (1908) L. R. 2 K. B. 89, an English corporation owned all the
stock of a German company, and it was contended that the profits of the
latter could be taxed as of the English company, but both courts regarded
the separate entity. In People ex rel. Studebaker Corp. v. Gilchrist (1926)
244 N. Y. 114, 155 N. E. 68, an attefnpt to tax a foreign parent on its
profits through the local subsidiary which operated at a loss failed, the
court saying: "Before the corporation persona may be ignored, the evidence
must show that the parent though in form speaking and acting through
another, is operating the business directly for itself."
" Berkey v. Third Ave. Ry., supra note 14; Bergenthal v. State Garage
and Trucking Co. (1922) 179 Wis. 42, 190 N. W. 901.
" Stone v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. (1911) 202 N. Y. 352, 95 N. E. 816.
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New York case, Berkey v. Third Avenue Ry.25 One Berkey, who
had been injured through the negligence of a motorman of the
Forty-Second Street Railway, the subsidiary, brought suit
against the parent, the Third Avenue Railway. The defendant,
who itself owned and operated a street railway, owned 99%
of the stock of the Forty-Second Street company, and was a
dominant stockholder in several other street railways. The lines
of the defendant and the subsidiary connected, and together
were known as the "Third Avenue System," although the fran-
chise to operate the particular line was in the subsidiary. The
boards of directors of the defendant and its subsidiary were
virtually the same, and the president, treasurer, general manager
and paymaster were identical. The general manager for the en-
tire system had charge of the superintendents of operation, who
in turn directed the motormen and conductors. The departments
for repairs, the printing plant, the employment bureau, the
legal. and accounting departments, and other activities were
single departments operated for the entire system but under the
direct control of the defendant, who paid all expenses and sal-
aries in the first instance and later prorated them and charged
them to the subsidiary's accounts. The cars were owned by the
defendant and leased to the subsidiary at a substantial daily
rental. The employees and cars never ran beyond their re-
spective lines. The subsidiary, though solvent, was heavily in-
debted, its chief creditor being the defendant who held its second
mortgage bonds, the first mortgage bonds being held by the gen-
eral public. The president of the Third Avenue Railway Com-
pany, in making its report to the stockholders of that company,
included the consolidated income of both companies in one
statement.
The Court of Appeals, through Judge Cardozo, held that the
parent was not liable for the tort of the subsidiary and that the
latter was not the alter ego of the former, in spite of the use of
the one company's assets by the other, the unity in operation, and
the general interchangeable names.28 The court evidently was
Supra note 14.
The First Appellate Division had reversed (217 App. Div. 504) a judg-
ment of dismissal on the theory that a question of fact existed as to whether
the corporations were not in fact one and the same. The Court of
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impressed by the facts that "the subsidiary was adequately
financed and solvent, that the rituals of the separate manage-
ment structures had been observed; that the details of the day to
day business of transportation were handled by two distinct per-
sonnels, except, insofar as economy and efficiency in operation
had persuaded duplication at strategic points. ' 27 There was a
strong dissenting opinion2 8 proceeding upon the theory that
where one corporation actually controls another and operates
both as a single system, the dominant company must bear the
unified burdens, including liability for torts of the subsidiary;
that while separate bookkeeping entries were made, "these
things cannot hide the reality or cover up the fact that the Third
Avenue Railway Company, in operation, in control, in domi-
nance, in execution, and in the furnishing of service to the city
of New York, was the Forty-Second Street Railway." It might
be pointed out that the majority opinion was influenced by the
consideration that a decision to the effect that the parent was
using and operating the subsidiary's franchise as its own would
carry with it criminal liability. The conclusion of the majority
has never recommended itself to the writer; the only separation
of the entities was an internal domestic distinction while, as the
minority opinion points out, there was one single enterprise, in-
terchangeability of assets, with the parent using the subsidiary
with the same flexibility and effect associated with direct owner-
ship. The three identities were present-control, ownership,
and business objective. Following the majority reasoning there
appear to be no limits to the assimilation which may be had for
the purposes of economy and efficiency. As one writer has
said, "Of the decision it might be stated: 'The victim is offered
up to the gods of jurisprudence on the altar of regularity.' ,,29
That the Berkey result has not been generally approved is shown
by the number of cases decided otherwise on substantially simi-
lar facts.30
Appeals, in the reversal, held that as a matter of law they were not one
and the same.
Douglas and Shanks, op. cit. 198, 199.
By Crane, J., concurred in by Pound, J.
- Wormser, op. cit. 23.
"Davis v. Alexander (1925) 269 U. S. 114; Lehigh Valley R. R. v.
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In Auglaize Box Board Co. v. Hintonal the parent took over
the operation of the factory of the insolvent subsidiary, osten-
sibly operating it as a separate concern in the name of the latter.
The officers of the subsidiary had no voice and performed no
duties subsequent to the change. The parent took out liability
insurance in the name of the subsidiary, paying the premium out
of its own funds. An employee injured after the change in
operation was permitted to recover from the parent. Although
the case appears to present a much clearer one for liability than
the Berkey case because of the complete change in domination
and control from officers of the subsidiary to those of the parent,
and because the former was actually and directly operated by
the latter as a part of its general business, we must note that in
the Berkey case the same domination was effected through the
officers who were identical for both companies, and that the dif-
ferentiation in assets was little more than one of bookkeeping as
far as the ultimate owners-the stockholders-were concerned.
A clear case of assimilation was presented in Joseph R. Foard
Co. v. State of Maryland.32 The subsidiary, which had an au-
thorized capital of $2000, paid by the parent through dummy in-
corporators, was organized to carry on the stevedore business of
a shipbroker parent, both having identical officers and directors.
The superintendent and stevedores were employed by the sub-
sidiary, but practically no stockholders' or directors' meetings of
the subsidiary were held. The parent handled the funds of both
through its own account, and paid the expenses of both, keeping
books as though the subsidiary was nothing more than a depart-
ment of its business. Losses of the subsidiary were carried into
the profit and loss account of the parent, which did not consider
itself a creditor. In many instances the parent used facilities of
the subsidiary directly, ignoring the management of the sub-
sidiary. The parent was held liable for damages caused by the
negligence of an employee of the stevedoring companies, the
Delachesa (C. C. A. 2, 1906) 145 F. 617; J. R. Foard Co. v. State of Mary-
land (C. C. A. 4, 1914) 219 F. 827; Pennsylvania R. R. v. Sellers (1889)
127 Pa. St. 466; Auglaise Box Board Co. v. Hinton (1919) 100 Ohio St.
505, 126 N. E. 881.
'Supra note 30.
'2Supra note 30.
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court saying, "Whatever may have been the original design when
the Foard Company caused to be organized the General Steve-
doring Company, the evidence leaves no doubt that the steve-
doring, whether done under one or the other corporate names,
was in reality but a department of the business of the Foard
Company as ship-brokers and agents." The same result was
reached on similar facts in Davis v. Alexander" where the
parent railroad company actually controlled another railroad
and operated both as a single system. Where there is direct con-
trol and complete unification into a single merged activity there
is little doubt as to liability.34
In Stone v. C. C. C. & St. L. Ry. 5 the parent escaped liability
where the facts fell considerably short of assimilation and in-
terdependent operation. Here the parent owned a majority of
the stock of the subsidiary and advertised the two as a system; a
minority of the directors of the subsidiary were directors of the
parent; several of the executive officers were duplicated; the
offices of both were in the same building. But the inferences
from these facts were rebutted by evidence showing that the sub-
sidiary made its own contracts, kept its own accounts, collected
its own revenues, paid its own expenses, and that the parent's
major interest was in the dividend return on its stock. And
assimilation was not reached in Friedman v. Vandalia R. R. 36
= Supra note 30.
Pennsylvania R. R. v. Sellers, supra note 30. The rolling stock of the
two companies was used indiscriminately on either line, the trainmen on
either line wore unitorm clothing, marked with the insignia of the parent;
tickets over the subsidiary were sold by the parent, which termed the sub-
sidiary one division of its road; the principal officers of both were the same;
the general freight department of the parent issued orders to the sub-
sidiary's agents; and advertisements referred to the subsidiary as a road
leased, operated, and controlled by defendant. In Finnish Temperance So-
ciety v. Finnish Socialistic Publishing Company (1921) 238 Mass. 345, 130
N. E. 845, the parent publishing company, which organized the subsidiary
for the sole purpose of publishing a newspaper and to manage and use it as
a creature or mouthpiece for the circulation of its propaganda, was held
for a libel published by the subsidiary.
"Supra note 24.
N (C. C. A. 8, 1916) 254 F. 292. A number of railroads entering St.
Louis organized the subsidiary, the St. Louis Terminal Railroad Associa-
tion, each holding an equal number of shares and appointing one of the
directors. Each railroad had the joint use of the property, and any em-
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where the parent, by contract with the subsidiary, had certain
potential rights of direct interference with the subsidiary, but
had never exercised them. The mere fact of stock ownership
does not merge the entities in the absence of evidential facts such
as those found in the above cases.3 7 Thus where the subsidiary
is adequately financed, maintains a separate organization with
separate transactions and records the parent will not.be held
liable for the tort of the subsidiary though they occupied the
same offices, used the same telephone, and were both engaged in
the same type of business.38
That the parent cannot arbitrarily disregard the separate
management structure of the subsidiary by giving one manager
extensive control over the properties of the two companies, the
subsidiary acquiescing because of the parent's control, is shown
by Costan v. Manila Electric Co.,39 the court attaching the bur-
dens to the benefits of ownership:
we think it is apparent that by it [the management
contract] the holding company undertook to assume com-
plete control of the operation of its subsidiaries. It em-
ployed a manager to operate their properties, authorized him
to hire operating employees on its behalf, to fix their sal-
aries, and to discharge them, and to purchase labor, ma-
terials, and supplies, in its name and on its behalf, necessary
for operation for construction work. The manager's actions
are made subject only to such general supervision as may
be exercised by the director of the holding company, not of
the subsidiaries whose properties are to be operated. In
short the holding company utterly disregards the Manila
Electric Company as a distinct corporate entity, except per-
haps for bookkeeping purposes, and deals with its proper-
ties and their operation as a street railway exactly as
though the legal title were in the holding company.
ployee of the subsidiary was removable on request in writing of any of the
roads. The court held that the relationship of the parent to the subsidiary
was merely that of a stockholder who contracted for services.
' Bethlehem Steel Co. v. Raymond Concrete Pile Co. (1922) 141 Ind. 67,
118 Atl. 279; Atchison, Topeka & S. F. R. R. v. Cochran (1890) 43 Kan.
225, 23 Pac. 151.
"Bergenthal v. State Garage & Trucking Co. (1922) 179 Wis. 42, 190
N. W. 901.(C. C. A. 2, 1916) 24 F. (2d) 383. That bookkeeping is not a decisive
factor apart from the actual manner of conducting business is shown in
Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck (1926) 242 N. Y. 106, 151 N. E. 146.
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The element of control was found too great to prevent liability
of the parent in The William Van Driel, Sr.40 although separate
management structures were maintained, where there was
duplication to some extent of the officers of the parent railway
company and the subsidiary grain elevator, and where the rail-
road issued orders as to management of the subsidiary, con-
trolled its funds and their disposal, despite the fact that separate
stockholders' and directors' meetings were held.
In cases where there is difficulty in determining the existence
of separate management structures, the doubt has been resolved
in favor of liability of the dominant company. This was the
case in Oriental Investing Co. v. Barclay,41 plus the additional
factor of inadequate financing of the subsidiary-the parent sup-
plying only $2000 in the form of a stock subscription-to operate
a substantial hotel business. The parent may not successfully
evade tort liability where it uses the subsidiary as a construction
and operating unit, if by the contract with the subsidiary it
milks the latter of all profits and at the same time makes itself
a secured creditor of the subsidiary by a mortgage on its prop-
erty, and reserves a right of direct interference. Thus the court
in Erickson v. Minnesota & Ontario Power Co.42 in effect holds
that the parent company may not do business through a sub-
sidiary and at the same time safeguard itself against con-
comitant obligations, thereby throwing all the risk on persons
coming in contact with the subsidiary. One cannot eat the
business pie and still have it. The same principle applies where
the activities of the two companies are inextricably intermingled
and so confused that it is impossible to identify the activity as
that of the parent or of the subsidiary. The courts cannot be ex-
pected to accomplish the separation which the companies have
failed to effect.43 In a final group of cases, represented by Le-
- (C. C. A. 4, 1918) 252 F. 35.
" (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) 64 S. W. 80.
1 (1916) 134 Minn. 209, 158 N. W. 979.
Wichita, F. & N. W. Ry. v. Puckett (1915) 530 Okla. 463, 157 Pac.
112 (Both railroad companies had a common superintendent and master
mechanic, and used rolling-stock interchangeably) ; Lehigh Valley R. R. v.
Delachesa (C. C. A. 2, 1906) 145 F. 617, the court saying: "The question
was not one of practical importance to the defendant, but merely whether
it should be called upon to pay out of one or another of its several purses."
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high Valley Ry. v. Dupont,4 4 the holding company has been held
liable purely on the basis of stock control even though the busi-
nesses were separately operated and managed with the subsid-
iary having a distinct and adequate financial backbone. In the
Dupont case it was said that the parent should be held liable be-
cause "the dominant corporation ultimately derives all the prof-
its and incurs all the losses arising from the traffic originating on
any of the lines." However, the ultimate interest in profits or
losses characterizes every parent-subsidiary relationship, so that
this can hardly be said to be a true basis of liability, absent other
factors. Although the approach in the case seems to be a proper
one, the ultimate reason assigned for liability does not bear
inquiry.
Some cases have been asserted to support the theory that
ownership of stock alone, carrying with it "ultimate" and "po-
tential" control, is sufficient to entail liability. But in most of
these the plaintiff can also trace his injury back to some neglect
of duty by the parent. Such a case is Specht v. Mo. Pac. R. R., 45
where the plaintiff was injured because of a defective coupler
in a car owned by the parent but which was in the possession of
the subsidiary under an operating contract which provided that
when rolling stock came onto the lines of the subsidiary such
cars should become units in the subsidiary. Responsibility for
the defect belongs to the parent, the owner, and the provision of
the operating contract could not affect the plaintiff's rights.
In Radio-Craft Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. & Mfg. Co.,48 which
The decision, however, is supportable on the separate ground that the de-
fendant itself was engaged in the transaction leading to the tort, although
the employees involved were those of the subsidiary.
(C. C. A. 2, 1904) 128 F. 840. Aside from the parent-subsidiary feature,
this case may be justified on the ground that the ticket, though calling for
transportation on the subsidiary's line, had been purchased from defendant,
and did not refer to the subsidiary, but was an undertaking of the parent
which it could not delegate to another and thereby avoid all liability.
" (1923) 154 Minn. 314, 191 N. W. 905. See Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. v. Cities
Service Co. (D. Del. 1922) 281 F. 214, where the parent, by means of it
stock ownership, induced the subsidiary to breach a contract with plain-
tiff. Also Ufa Eastern Division Distribution v. Universum Film
Aktiengesellschaft (Memo. order of affirmance Nov. 22, 1929, in Appellate
Division, 237 N. Y. S. 912).
46 (1925) 7 F. (2d) 432. The same result was reached in Radio-Craft Co.
v. Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. (D. N. J. 1923) 291 F. 169, aff'd (C.
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is representative of the patent infringement suits, the evidence
indicated that the Radio-Craft Company was a mere instrumen-
tality of the De Forest Company, which acquired the stock of
the former company for the purpose of using that corporation
as a cover for its own transactions. The De Forest Company
made its own employees officers of the subsidiary in order to be
"fully covered on this patent situation" as its vice president
wrote. The court in finding for liability repeats the principle
which is repeated in most of the cases, that,
Where stock control has been resorted to not for the purpose
of participating in the affairs of the corporation in the
normal and usual manner, but for the purpose of controlling
the company, so that it may be used as a mere agency or in-
strumentality of the owning company, courts will look
through the screen of separate corporate control and place
the responsibility where it actually belongs.
However, in Owl Fumigating Corporation v. California Cyanide
Co.,- in spite of ownership of all the subsidiary's stock, identity
of officers, and a close financial relationship, the conclusion was
for nonliability because it appeared that the parent did not
organize the subsidiary to infringe the plaintiff's patent and
that the parent's purpose in organizing the subsidiary could be
executed without an infringement. Such an approach would
seem to beg the real question, which concerns the parent's vicari-
ous liability through the intermediacy of the subsidiary.
II.
Liability of the holding company for contract obligations of
its subsidiary cannot rest on a contractual basis, since it is the
subsidiary which is the contracting party, and normally the
stockholder-whether a natural person or a corporation-is
not bound thereby. In order that the plaintiff may hold one
whose liability he did not bargain for, much the same circum-
stances must exist as in the tort cases before the separate entity
C. A. 3, 1925) 7 F. (2d) 432, where there was complete assimilation in man-
agement and operation in the production and marketing processes, and in
Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Allis Chalmers Co. (C. C. A. 3, 1910)
176 F. 362. See Union Sulphur Co. v. Freeport Texas Co. (D. Del. 1918)
251 F. 634.
" (D. Del. 1928) 24 F. (2d) 718, aff'd (C. C. A. 3, 1929) 30 F. (2d) 812.
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of the subsidiary will be disregarded. Here again ownership or
common holding of the stock of the subsidiary is a sine qua non,
but, as in the tort cases, the normal control which is the incident
of stock ownership is not in itself productive of liability.48
It is necessary to eliminate from consideration a large number
of cases where the parent has been held for obligations of the
subsidiary on a theory other than that of vicarious liability.
Thus the parent may be estopped to deny liability where it has
led the claimant to rely on its ownership as an assurance of re-
payment,4 or where the parent causes a transfer of assets of the
subsidiary in fraud of creditors)o In some cases the decisions
find alternative bases in contractual liability,8 ' but in the ma-
jority of cases liability is predicted because of some fraudulent
or illegal purpose which is sought to be accomplished through
the subsidiary device.52 Numerous assaults have been made by
this means on complete enforcement of the anti-trust regula-
tions, the commodity clause, and orders of the Interstate Com-
Martin v. Development Co. of America (C. C. A. 9, 1917) 240 F. 42;
City of Holland v. Holland City Gas Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1919) 257 F. 679;
Allen v. Philadelphia (C. C. A. 3, 1920) 265 F. 817; Hooper Maniken Co. v.
Matthew Addy Co. (C. C. A. 6, 1925) 4 F. (2d) 187; Majestic Co. v.
Orpheum Circuit (C. C. A. 8, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 720. In N. Y. Air Brake
Co. v. International Steam Pump Co. (1909) 64 Misc. Rep. 347, the capital
stock of two manufacturing companies was owned by a third company, all
having common officers and offices, and acting through a common agent.
Plaintiff, who contracted with the two subsidiaries, sued all three companies,
but his suit for breach of contract against the third corporation was dis-
missed on the ground that redress must be sought "by pursuing the par-
ticular corporation with which it contracted."
"Platt v. Bradner Co. (1924) 131 Wash. 573, 230 Pac. 633.
' Pennsylvania Canal Co. v. Brown (C. C. A. 3, 1916) 235 F. 669 (parent
held for losses occasioned to bondholders for causing diversions of sub-
sidiary's sinking fund); B. & 0. Tel. Co. v. Interstate Tel. Co. (C. C. A. 4,
1893) 54 F. 50 (sale price of subsidiary's property held trust fund where
the railroad company parent organized, and controlled the telegraph com-
pany, duplicated the latter's officers, supplied all its capital, and caused the
sale of the subsidiary's assets when plaintiff obtained a judgment).
" Dobbins v. Pratt Chuck Co. (1926) 242 N. Y. 106, 151 N. E. 146;
American Nat. Bank v. National Wall-Paper Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1896) 177 F.
85. See also Pullman Car Co. v. Mo. Pac. R. R. (1885) 115 U. S. 587.
2 Rice v. Sanger Bros. (1924) 27 Ariz. 15, 229 Pac. 397; George v. Rol-
lins (1913) 176 Mich. 144, 142 N. W. 337 (defendant organized new cor-
poration in order to evade agreements not to use plaintiff's name). Hig-
gins v. California P. & A. Co. (1905) 147 Cal. 363, 81 Pac. 1070.
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merce Commission, illustrated by U. S. v. Lehigh Valley R. R.,53
U. S. v. Del. Lack. & West. R. R.54 and other cases, but where dis-
covered they have in most cases failed.55
Greater significance has been attached by the courts dealing
with contract obligations to the factor of adequate financial sta-
bility of the subsidiary. In Luckenbach S. S. Co. v. W. R. Grace
& Co.56 the parent was held for a breach by the subsidiary where
the former leased to the subsidiary (which had a $10,000 capitali-
zation as contrasted with the parent's capital of $800,000) its
fleet of steamships at an inconsiderable rental, with the subsid-
iary functioning to assume contract obligations which otherwise
would fall upon the parent. The same officers and directors con-
trolled the destinies of both companies. Without hesitation the
court declared: "It would be unconscionable to allow the owner
of this fleet of steamers, worth millions of dollars, to escape lia-
bility because it had turned them over a year before to a $10,000
corporation which is simply itself in another form."
In Portsmouth Cotton Oil Mfg. Corp. v. Fourth Nat'l Bank57
a bank organized a corporation, whose stockholders were officers
in the bank which supplied the entire capital, to operate an oil
refining business which it had purchased. All the activities of
the business were carried on under supervision of the bank so
that in a suit for a breach of warranty by the subsidiary it was
not difficult to hold the parent in view of the direct administra-
tion by it, through its officers, of the affairs of the subsidiary,
and of the financial dependence of the subsidiary. In McClintic-
Marshall Co. ,v. Scandinavian-American Bldg. Co. 8 under sub-
stantially similar facts a bank was held not liable where it organ-
ized a building company to construct a building for the bank and
- (1911) 220 U. S. 257 (commodities clause).
(1915) 238 U. S. 516 (commodities clause).
G Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. Minn. Civic Ass'n (1918) 247 U. S. 490;
U. S. v. Reading Co. (1919) 253 U. S. 26 (Anti-Trust Act); U. S. v. United
Shoe Machinery Co. (1916) 234 F. 127 (Anti-Trust Act); U. S. v. Mil-
waukee Refrigerator Transit Co. (1905) 142 F. 247; Northern Securities
Co. v. U. S. (1904) 193 U. S. 197; People v. North River Refining Co.
(1890) 121 N. Y. 582, 24 N. E. 834.
(C. C. A. 4, 1920) 267 F. 676.
(N. D. Ala. 1922) 280 F. 879.
(C. C. A. 9, 1923) 289 F. 405.
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where the two corporations had virtually identical officers and
shareholders 9 Liability did not follow in City of Holland v.
Holland City Gas Co.6 0 where the holding company acquired
stock control of a gas company, elected its own directors and offi-
cers to similar positions in the gas company, and included it in"
the parent's prospectus, the court making the significant
admission:
It -must be conceded, however, that through acquisition of
shares of stock in the gas company, and through interrela-
tions of its directorate and officers of the two companies, the
Delaware Company secured opportunity alike to benefit or
to injure the interests of the gas company and its patrons.
The degree and form of intervention in the affairs of the sub-
sidiary has been the decisive test in such cases as Stark Flee.
R. R. v. McGinty Contracting Co.0' and Dillard & Coffin Co. v.
Richmond Cotton Oil Co. 62 In the former case an officer of the
parent participated in the particular transaction, representing
the parent as backing the subsidiary. Another important factor
was the great disparity of capital-the parent having a $1,000,-
000 capitalization, while the subsidiary construction company
had a paid-up capital of only $1,000. In the latter case officers
of the parent supervised the daily business of the subsidiary, and
in some cases paid the debts. Community in the processes of
production and in business objective were determinative of lia-
bility in Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Geyer :63
. . The M. Rumely Company [parent] manufactured
certain articles of machinery or certain machinery. It is
'In Hooper-Maniken Co. v. Matthew Addy Co., supra note 48, evidence
of corporate control through stock ownership, the manner of stock sales, the
similarity of names and stationery, the use of corporate insignia, the repre-
sentations of sales agents, credit reports, and the fact that joint offices were
maintained and financial aid was given, was held insufficient to require
submission to the jury of the question of instrumentality. In N. Y. Trust
Co. v. Carpenter (C. C. A. 6, 1918) 250 F. 666, and in Marsch v. Southern
New Eng. R. R. (1918) 230 Mass. 483, 120 N. E. 120, lack of concealment
of the parent-subsidiary relationship, and a fully cognizant reliance by
the plaintiffs on the subsidiary influenced the decisions.
'Supra note 48.
(C. C. A. 6, 1917) 238 F. 657.
(1918) 140 Tenn. 290, 204 S. W. 758.
(1918) 40 N. D. 18, 168 N. W. 731.
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evident that the mere manufacture of the machinery did not
terminate the object for which such corporation was organ-
ized. The machinery which it manufactured had to be
marketed, and if the Rumely products company [subsidiary],
a corporation, was organized for the specific purpose of
marketing such machinery of the Rumely Company as it
manufactured, the marketing process was equally as im-
portant.
and
• __the conclusion is irresistible that they were really
in effect, one company, though operated under separate
names and possibly with entirely distinct shareholders.
A contrary view, and one highly welcomed by holding com-
panies, is advanced in Kingston Dry Dock Co. v. Lake Cham-
plain Tran. & R. Co." where Judge Hand asserts:
Liability must normally depend upon the parent's direct
intervention in the transaction, ignoring the subsidiary's
paraphernalia of incorporation, directors and officers. The
test is therefore rather in the form than in the substance
of the control; in whether it is exercised immediately, or by
means of a board of directors and officers, left to their own
initiative and responsibility in respect of each transaction
as it arises. Some line must obviously be drawn, if share-
holding alone does not fuse the corporations in every case.
This theory, pressed to a logical extreme, governed in an earlier
case, Borough of Ambridge v. Philadelphia Co., 5 and resulted
in palpable injustice. The directors and officers of parent and
subsidiary were identical; the parent financed the latter by ad-
vances on open account, the parent owning all the bonds of the
subsidiary in addition to the stock; the directors of the subsid-
iary met infrequently, while the officers of the latter, being also
officers in the former, assured the parent unified control and
operation. In spite of these and other evidences of relationship,
the court was impressed by the superficial distinction maintained
and the fact that
The physical property and the franchise of the Pittsburgh
Beaver line [subsidiary] are in its name and owned by that
- (C. C. A. 2, 1929) 31 F. (2d) 265.
(1925) 283 Pa. St. 5, 129 AtI. 67.
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company. The Philadelphia Company [parent] eo nomine,
could not dispose of a dollar's worth thereof; nor could it,
eo nomine, operate cars over the Pittsburgh & Beaver line,
or make any use whatever of the latter's rights and
franchises.
On this basis vicarious liability of the parent is impossible, and
liability, if at all, could be founded only on direct intervention
in the transaction sued upon.
Essentially the same considerations are raised in cases in-
volving the bankruptcy of the parent or subsidiary, or both, and
where the one or its creditors seek to share in the distribution of
the assets of the other, or where both companies are sought to be
adjudicated although only one is insolvent. It is safe to general-
ize that where the circumstances would point to liability of the
parent for acts of its subsidiary that assets of the subsidiary
will' be held to be assets of the bankrupt parent corporation.10
In In re Rieger, Kapner & Altmark7 the subsidiary corporation
was adjudicated with the parent partnership, where the part-
nership, engaged in the commission business, acquired for part-
nership purposes 999% of the stock of a manufacturing corpora-
tion, each partner holding an equal amount of the stock, and as
directors and officers managing the business of the corporation,
the partnership taking and selling all of the output. The same
result was reached in In re Muncie Pulp Co., 8 where the same
shareholders held the stock of both companies, there being iden-
tical directors, but no separate books being kept. On similar
facts a contrary result was reached in In re Watertown Paper
Co.69 Here, after the organization of a paper company, its stock-
holders organized a pulp company. Both companies mingled
In re Eilers Music House (1921) 270 F. 915, 274 F. 330; In re Rieger,
Kapner & Altmark (1907) 157 F. 609; Re Muncie Pulp Co. (1905) 139 F.
546.
OSupra note 66.
Supra note 66.
(1909) 169 F. 252. In First Nat. Bank v. Walton (1928) 146 Wash.
367, 262 Pac. 984, the solvent subsidiary was not adjudicated with the
parent, although there was a close operating relationship, the subsidiary
having been formed to better finance and carry out the marketing of the
output, and the officers were identical, the general business being carried
on from the office of parent, and the subsidiary's lumber being kept on the
parent's premises.
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their affairs, the paper company purchasing the output of the
pulp company; and the stockholders regarded the two companies
merely as departments of the same business. However, each
operated in its own name, and separate books were maintained.
These more or less fortuitious circumstances preserved the sep-
arate entities in the eyes of the court, and the pulp company was
allowed to share in the paper company's assets.
The converse situation has been raised in a number of cases
where the parent seeks to share in the assets of the insolvent
subsidiary in competition with the creditors of the latter. Here
the courts have been instinctively reluctant, and properly so, to
allow the parent, which has the choice originally in determining
the business structure, to choose the subsidiary method as one
by which it can enjoy limited liability at the same time exercis-
ing effective control, whether direct or indirect, and yet to share
in the subsidiary's assets in competition with the latter's credi-
tors.70 This was the result in S. G. V. Co. of Delaware v. S. G.
V. Co. of Pennsylvania", where both companies had common offi-
cers and some common directors, but the board of directors of
the subsidiary being a figurehead and transacting no business,
the affairs and finances of both companies being arranged for
by the directors of the parent.
IIL
Two related aspects of the problem, not thus far treated,
should be referred to briefly for purposes of completeness. The
first, which is merely mentioned here, since it does not fall with-
in the scope of the discussion, is that of criminal liability of the
holding company for acts which would subject the subsidiary to
penal consequences. There is little or no direct authority on
this phase, but it may be suggested that partly because of the
strict construction of criminal statutes and also because of the
difficulty of determining evidentially, even in the case of one
corporation, where responsibility justly is to be attached, that
the insulation offered by the holding company relation will pro-
' Hunter v. Baker Motor Vehicle Co. (1915) 225 F. 1006; Clere Clothing
Co. v. Union Trust, etc., Bank (1915) 224 F. 363; S. G. V. Co. v. S. G. V.
Co. (1919) 264 Pa. St. 265, 107 Atl. 721.
"Supra note 70.
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tect the holding company and its officers from criminal liability
in all but the clearest cases of direct intervention, control, and
perhaps, commission of the particular criminal acts. In de-
termining the question of criminal liability under specific statu-
tory provisions, it is evident that little weight can be attached to
such factors, important as they are in civil liability, as adequate
financial basis and separate books, records, etc. Vicarious crimi-
nal liability, in the sense used as to civil liability, is not a prin-
ciple favored by the criminal law.
The second phase, and one of growing practical importance, is
that involving the question of jurisdiction of foreign parent or
holding corporations by means of service of process on the local
subsidiary. The issue is not directly one of liability, but when
it is decided that a foreign corporation has been properly served
because it is doing business in a state through a subsidiary, on
whom the process has been served, we are given further criteria
on the merger of entities. The courts, however, distinguish
sharply between the jurisdiction and liability cases, since the
former cases are concerned with the application of the technical,
perhaps artificial, concept of "doing business" in the state, and
consequently one type of case is not authority for the other.2
As generally stated, the jurisdictional rule is that a foreign cor-
poration can be personally served with process only when it is
doing business within a state.73 Here, as in the case of liability,
ownership of stock in the subsidiary does not bring the person
or corporation owning the stock within the state in the sense of
"doing business" there.74 But too close an operative relation-
ship will meet the jurisdictional test, as in Cutter v. Cutler-Ham-
mer Mfg. Co.,75 where the parent was held to be present through
See, on the problem generally, Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Cor-
porations (1917) 30 HARv. L. REv. 676; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Non-Resi-
dents Doing Business Within a State (1929) 32 HARv. L. Rxsv. 871.
" Riverside, etc., Mills v. Menefee (1915) 237 U. S. 189.
"Peterson v. C. R. I. & P. R. R. Co. (1906) 205 U. S. 364; Mechanical
Appliance Co. v. Castleman (1909) 225 U. S. 437; Bank of America v.
Whitney Bank (1922) 261 U. S. 171. In the Peterson case there was com-
plete identity of organization, yet the decision was against jurisdiction.
" (D. Mass. 1920) 266 F. 388. In Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works
(1902) 190 U. S. 406, there was no jurisdiction where the subsidiary was
the selling agent of the parent, both using the same management structure.
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the subsidiary, its selling agent, the parent exercising control
through the subsidiary's manager who received his salary di-
rectly from the parent, which collected the money on sales by the
subsidiary. This in spite of a separate bookkeeping system-a
factor which has unduly influenced many decisions.
The jurisdictional line has been drawn in two recent cases,
Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co.,76 and Industrial Re-
search Corporation v. General Motors Corporation.7 7 In the first
case, where a foreign corporation marketed its products through
a subsidiary which it completely dominated through stock
ownership, but which maintained a superficially distinct corpor-
ate entity, and which did not act as the agent of the parent but
instead bought goods from the parent and sold them to dealers
to be shipped directly from the parent, it was held that the
parent company, in a suit against it, could not be served through
the subsidiary. The entities were recognized in spite of the fact
that the parent exercised the same control over the subsidiary
that it did over selling branches or departments of its business
not separately incorporated which were established to market
the same products in other states. The result was to the con-
trary in the second case, a suit for patent infringement, in which
the General Motors Corporation was sought to be held for acts
of its subsidiaries. A motion to quash service on the Ohio sub-
sidiary was denied, though the General Motors Corporation was
a Delaware corporation which did no business in Ohio in its own
name. The evidential facts which supported the decision, and
perhaps distinguish it from the Cudahy case, aside from stock
ownership, were that the advertising and annual reports of the
parent treated the subsidiary companies as mere divisions and
operating adjuncts of the holding company, which controlled
and directed their policies and business. In any event it is clear
that the parent-subsidiary relationship exemplified in such cases
In Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal Co. (1908) 211 U. S. 293, the decision
was in favor of jurisdiction where it was showm that the subsidiary had no
independent existence, apart from the purpose of obtaining federal juris-
diction on the basis of diversity of citizenship. See also La Varre v. Inter-
national Paper Co. (1929) 37 F. (2d) 141.(1925) 267 U. S. 333.
(1928) 29 F. (2d) 623; (1929) 14 ST. Louis L. Ray. 436.
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is an assurance of sufficient notice to satisfy that element of the
due process clause.
CONCLUSION
The writer does not have the temerity to hope that the more
or less detailed discussion of the cases above will lead to an en-
lightened viewpoint on the problem of the liability of the hold-
ing company for acts of its subsidiaries, in view of the present
hopeless confusion of approach and logic. Such a discussion
can have its only value in indicating what the courts are doing
and how they are doing it. The use of the holding company de-
vice, still in its infancy, is already the source of much judicial
perplexity. Whether such states as New Jersey and Maryland,
among those sponsoring the holding company method, are in-
cubating a species of legal-economic Frankenstein monster re-
mains to be seen.78 In the interim, until a crystallization of leg-
islative reaction either in inhibition or stimulation, it is believed
that an effective form of regulation can be exercised by the
courts through a judicious predisposition against, rather than in
favor of; the recognition of the separate entities at all costs. The
parent-subsidiary form of business activity carries with it dis-
tinct advantages which, under an omnipresent system of com-
pensation, requires a balancing of regulatory disadvantages. A
readier piercing of the corporate insulation is one remedy.
The following principles state as definitely as is possible in the
premises the circumstances in which the holding company should
be held for obligations of the subsidiary: (1) The real parties
in interest to reap the benefits of the business of both corpora-
tions must be, at least in large part, identical; (2) The holding
company must be in a position to exercise, and have 'exercised,
its power of control; (3) Such power of control must have been
"The design of such corporations in the light of their history is evi-
dent, and from this it is apparent that their real purpose is to form and
foster monopolies and combinations. It is surprising at least that any
legislature in recent years as against present anti-trust and anti-monopoly
sentiments, should authorize the formation and the existence of corpora-
tions for such purposes, and to make it easily within their power practically
to neutralize and nullify all anti-trust laws. Such institutions are only
fathered by states that have gone 'corporation mad.'" 5 Thompson, Con-
PORATIONS (1927) sec. 4098.
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exercised so as to secure the transaction of such business by the
subsidiary corporation as would inure to the benefit of the con-
trolling corporation and its stockholders by virtue of their
ownership of stock in the controlling corporation and would not
inure to the benefit of the stockholders of the subsidiary cor-
poration as such."" Under such principles the criteria of a
formal separate management structure, separate financial opera-
tions, etc., though of evidential significance, assume minor im-
portance. The underlying philosophy is the justifiable assump-
tion that unified business activity cannot be divorced from uni-
fied business risk.
The views stated above do not appear to cover sufficiently the
question of liability in the case of the "pure" holding company
which is engaged in no activity other than the holding of stock.
It is clear to the writer, however, that liability will not exist as
to these, except where the above indicia are found to exist; 8
and these characteristics, it can be seen, are more often to be
found in the case of the parent and subsidiary companies which
together form elements in the productive processes. Another
version of the relationship which presents difficulties for judicial
treatment, and one which is growing in favor with utilities, is
the formation of a foreign holding company by persons inter-
ested in local utilities, the management structure of the hold-
ing company being a mere dummy of the "subsidiary." The
advantages of this device for purposes of rate manipulation are
evident, as can be testified by the citizenry of a large mid-
western municipality.
In conclusion we agree with the writer who has pierced
through to the real significance of the problem:8,.
Subsidiary corporations not only have legitimate uses, but
also are in most cases legitimately used. There is no reason
to assume that they are essentially vicious, or that the build-
ing up of a structure based on interdependent corporate
units is not sound. Such a system, however, involves cer-
tain obvious perils. The primary danger arises out of the
fact that the management of a subsidiary has ceased to rep-
Note (1920) 4 MINN. L. REv. 219.
"Majestic Co. v. Orpheum Circuit (C. C. A. 8, 1927) 21 F. (2d) 720.
"Berle: STUDIES IN THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE (1928) 174.
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resent the interests of the enterprise in which the subsidiary
is itself engaged. Rather, it is the protagonist of a pareht
involved in far wider schemes, and the particular enterprise
of the subsidiary is only one part of a much greater plan.
The temptation, consequently, is to use the corporate
structure of the subsidiary to evade obligations of the
parent and to manipulate the credit of the subsidiary to sup-
port transactions which may not benefit the other holders
in the subsidiary [and the public] .82 This creates a situa-
tion of fact,, of which, it is submitted, the law must take
cognizance.
Brackets my own.
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